



## Digital Interoperability and the Reconfiguration of Regional Coordination: A Mechanism-Based Perspective from Emerging Platform Economies

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### Abstrak

*Digital interoperability has emerged as a defining feature of contemporary regional digital economies, yet its role in reshaping cross-border coordination remains under-theorized. While prior research emphasizes regulatory harmonization or platform governance within domestic markets, less attention has been devoted to how interoperable infrastructures reorganize regional coordination in the absence of supranational authority. This article develops a mechanism-based conceptual framework explaining how digital interoperability reconfigures regional institutional alignment in emerging platform economies. Integrating Transaction Cost Economics, ecosystem boundary theory, and regional coordination scholarship, the study identifies four interrelated mechanisms: transaction cost compression, institutional substitution, ecosystem boundary expansion, and coordinated decentralization. Together, these mechanisms demonstrate how infrastructural synchronization can stabilize cross-border exchange without requiring political integration. The framework advances a configurational perspective, arguing that interoperability produces distinct regional outcomes depending on the degree of institutional fragmentation. By reframing interoperability as infrastructural governance rather than technical compatibility, this study contributes to strategy and institutional scholarship and offers a bounded explanation of how digital economies integrate under fragmented governance conditions.*

### Keywords

digital interoperability; regional coordination; platform ecosystems; transaction cost economics; institutional substitution; emerging platform economies

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# 1. Introduction

Persistent lorem ipsum volatility has become a structurally embedded condition of contemporary placeholder environments rather than a temporary deviation from equilibrium. Accelerated information diffusion, organizational structuring, strategic fragmentation, technological transition, and systemic adjustment cycles have collectively intensified uncertainty and compressed decision windows (Author et al., 20XX; Example & Sample, 20XX; Placeholder, Name, & Author, 20XX).

Digital markets have historically been theorized as inherently borderless. The scalability of platforms, the mobility of data, and the modularity of cloud-based infrastructures encouraged the assumption that digital expansion naturally transcends jurisdictional boundaries. Internationalization in platform industries was therefore conceptualized as a function of network effects, ecosystem orchestration, and standardized governance architectures (Adner, 2017; Jacobides et al., 2018). Yet recent developments across emerging platform economies challenge this narrative. Cross-border digital interoperability initiatives—linking instant payment systems, QR infrastructures, digital identity frameworks, and application programming interfaces—have proliferated in regions lacking supranational political authority. These initiatives reveal a structural shift: regional coordination is increasingly achieved not through treaty-based integration, but through infrastructural alignment.

This shift presents a theoretical puzzle. Regional integration scholarship traditionally associates coordination with formal institutional convergence, supranational enforcement, or hegemonic leadership (Keohane, 1984; Mattli, 1999). In contrast, many emerging regions operate without centralized political integration, yet exhibit increasing cross-border digital synchronization. Simultaneously, platform ecosystem research has focused primarily on governance control, complementor management, and domestic market structuring (Tiwana, 2014; Cennamo, 2021). Less attention has been devoted to how infrastructural interoperability across jurisdictions reorganizes coordination at the regional level. The literature therefore lacks a mechanism-based explanation of how digital interoperability reconfigures regional institutional alignment in the absence of supranational governance.

The growing diffusion of cross-border digital infrastructures underscores the importance of this gap. Regional payment linkages, interoperable QR standards, and cross-border settlement corridors reduce settlement friction and harmonize technical standards without requiring full regulatory unification. These developments suggest that coordination can be infrastructurally mediated rather than politically centralized. In such contexts, interoperability functions as more than technical compatibility; it becomes an institutional device that structures interaction across fragmented jurisdictions.

Existing research provides partial insights but remains fragmented. Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) explains how governance structures emerge to economize on coordination costs under conditions of uncertainty and bounded rationality (Williamson, 1985). More recent extensions highlight how digital complexity reshapes governance choices and hybrid arrangements (Verbeke & Hutzschenreuter, 2021; Chen et al., 2023). However, TCE has largely been applied to firm-level boundary decisions or platform governance configurations rather than to cross-border infrastructural coordination. Ecosystem scholarship similarly emphasizes interdependence, complementarity alignment, and boundary design (Adner, 2017; Kapoor, 2020), yet tends to analyze ecosystems within national or industry-defined contexts. Regional integration research, in turn, addresses interstate coordination but rarely incorporates digital infrastructures as endogenous coordination mechanisms.

As a result, three literatures—transaction cost theory, ecosystem strategy, and regional institutional coordination—remain insufficiently integrated in explaining how digital infrastructures reorganize cross-border markets. This fragmentation is particularly consequential in emerging platform economies, where political integration is limited,

regulatory heterogeneity persists, and yet digital linkages deepen. The absence of supranational authority raises the question: how does coordination occur?

This article advances the argument that digital interoperability functions as a mechanism of regional coordination by compressing transaction costs, expanding ecosystem boundaries, and substituting infrastructural alignment for formal institutional convergence. Rather than conceptualizing interoperability as a technical standard, we treat it as a structural governance device. In doing so, we shift analytical attention from regulatory harmonization to infrastructural synchronization.

The core claim is that cross-border interoperability produces coordination effects through four interrelated mechanisms. First, interoperability compresses cross-border transaction costs by standardizing interfaces and reducing settlement uncertainty. Second, it operates as a form of institutional substitution, enabling coordination in the absence of supranational enforcement. Third, it expands ecosystem boundaries by lowering jurisdictional participation barriers for complementors and users. Fourth, it generates coordinated decentralization: regional alignment without governance centralization. These mechanisms collectively reconfigure how regional markets function.

By articulating these mechanisms, this study contributes to three streams of scholarship. First, it extends Transaction Cost Economics beyond firm–market boundary analysis to encompass infrastructural coordination across jurisdictions. While TCE traditionally explains the emergence of firms and hybrids as responses to transaction hazards (Williamson, 1985), we demonstrate how digital interoperability operates as a quasi-hybrid governance arrangement at the regional level. Second, it advances ecosystem theory by reframing boundary expansion as a cross-jurisdictional phenomenon rather than an intra-industry governance choice. Recent ecosystem research emphasizes structural interdependence and complementor alignment (Jacobides et al., 2018; Kapoor, 2020), yet has not systematically examined how interoperability alters ecosystem topology across national boundaries. Third, the article contributes to regional integration theory by demonstrating how infrastructure can precede and partially substitute political convergence, aligning with emerging scholarship on interdependence and infrastructural power (Farrell & Newman, 2019).

Importantly, this argument differs from prevailing analyses that emphasize regulatory consolidation or territorial boundary-making. Whereas some studies examine how regulation segments markets or reinforces platform dominance, the present framework focuses on integration rather than segmentation, and coordination rather than control. Digital interoperability does not necessarily centralize authority; rather, it standardizes interaction while preserving jurisdictional autonomy. This distinction is critical for understanding emerging regions where sovereignty concerns coexist with economic integration ambitions.

The context of emerging platform economies provides a theoretically fertile environment for this inquiry. These markets are characterized by rapid digital adoption, heterogeneous regulatory regimes, and evolving institutional capacities. In such settings, interoperability initiatives often emerge as pragmatic solutions to coordination problems that outpace formal treaty-making. Observing how infrastructural alignment reorganizes cross-border interaction within these contexts offers insight into the evolving architecture of regional economic coordination.

By reframing digital interoperability as a structural coordination mechanism rather than a technical standard, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of how regional economic integration unfolds in digitally mediated environments.

## 2. Theoretical Foundations

Understanding how digital interoperability reconfigures regional coordination requires theoretical integration across three domains: Transaction Cost Economics, ecosystem boundary theory, and regional institutional coordination. Each provides partial insight into cross-border digital integration, yet none independently explains how infrastructural alignment substitutes for supranational governance in emerging platform economies. This section develops the conceptual foundations necessary for a mechanism-based explanation.

### 2.1 Transaction Cost Economics and Cross-Border Digital Coordination

Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) explains the emergence of governance structures as responses to coordination hazards arising from bounded rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). Markets fail when transaction costs—search, negotiation, monitoring, enforcement—exceed the efficiency of hierarchical or hybrid governance. Governance forms emerge to economize on these costs.

Traditional applications of TCE focus on firm boundaries and vertical integration decisions. However, digital infrastructures introduce a distinct coordination problem: cross-border interaction among heterogeneous institutional environments. When transactions span jurisdictions, additional layers of uncertainty emerge, including regulatory divergence, settlement risk, legal incompatibility, and monitoring ambiguity. These institutional frictions function as transaction hazards.

Recent strategy research has emphasized that digitalization alters governance complexity by increasing interdependence and modular interaction (Verbeke & Hutzschenreuter, 2021). Similarly, studies of platform governance highlight how coordination costs shape openness versus control decisions (Cennamo, 2021). Yet these analyses largely remain within firm-level or ecosystem-level boundaries. The cross-jurisdictional dimension of digital coordination remains under-theorized.

Digital interoperability alters this governance calculus. By standardizing technical interfaces, settlement protocols, and data exchange mechanisms across jurisdictions, interoperability reduces cross-border coordination costs. Importantly, this reduction does not require full legal harmonization. Instead, infrastructural alignment compresses search costs (through standardized identifiers), monitoring costs (through traceable transaction flows), and enforcement ambiguity (through shared technical rules).

In TCE terms, interoperability operates as a quasi-hybrid governance arrangement at the regional level. It neither internalizes transactions within a hierarchy nor relies purely on market exchange. Rather, it embeds standardized coordination mechanisms within shared infrastructure. The governance function shifts from contractual enforcement to protocol alignment.

This reinterpretation extends TCE beyond firm–market dichotomies toward infrastructural governance. Cross-border interoperability becomes a cost-compression device that stabilizes expectations without central authority. In emerging platform economies, where legal harmonization may lag behind digital adoption, such infrastructural governance can precede institutional convergence.

### 2.2 Ecosystem Boundaries and Cross-Jurisdictional Expansion

Ecosystem theory conceptualizes value creation as structured interdependence among autonomous yet coordinated actors (Adner, 2017; Jacobides et al., 2018). Ecosystems consist of complementors whose alignment determines overall system performance. Governance structures define access, coordination rules, and boundary permeability (Tiwana, 2014).

A core question within ecosystem research concerns boundary definition: which actors are included, under what conditions, and how participation is structured. Boundary expansion traditionally occurs through strategic platform decisions, such as opening APIs or forming alliances. However, cross-jurisdictional boundary expansion introduces additional institutional complexity.

Recent scholarship emphasizes that ecosystem structure is shaped by complementarity alignment rather than ownership integration (Kapoor, 2020). Complementors participate when coordination risks are manageable and participation costs are predictable. In cross-border contexts, institutional fragmentation increases uncertainty and raises participation barriers. Regulatory divergence, currency friction, and settlement ambiguity function as boundary constraints.

Digital interoperability redefines these constraints. By standardizing transaction interfaces across jurisdictions, interoperability reduces participation friction and lowers the cost of multi-homing. Complementors operating in one jurisdiction gain access to users in another without redesigning infrastructure. Ecosystem boundaries therefore expand not through strategic envelopment, but through infrastructural synchronization.

This shift is analytically distinct from governance centralization. Interoperability does not necessarily increase orchestrator control. Instead, it reconfigures the topology of interdependence. Actors remain locally governed, yet operate within shared technical standards. Ecosystem expansion becomes regionally distributed rather than hierarchically integrated.

This perspective extends ecosystem theory in two ways. First, it introduces cross-jurisdictional boundary expansion as a distinct phenomenon. Second, it highlights infrastructure as a coordination device that operates independently of ownership or platform dominance. In emerging platform economies, where sovereignty concerns limit centralized governance, infrastructural alignment offers an alternative pathway to ecosystem integration.

### **2.3 Regional Institutional Coordination Without Supranational Authority**

Regional integration theory traditionally links coordination to formal institutional convergence. Cooperation is often explained through treaty-based harmonization, supranational enforcement, or hegemonic leadership (Keohane, 1984; Mattli, 1999). In such models, institutional alignment results from negotiated political integration.

However, many emerging regions lack centralized political authority capable of enforcing uniform standards. Regulatory heterogeneity persists, yet economic interdependence deepens. This disjunction raises a critical question: how can coordination occur without political integration?

Recent scholarship on interdependence highlights the structural power embedded in infrastructure (Farrell & Newman, 2019). Networks and technological systems create patterns of dependence that influence behavior independently of formal governance. Coordination may therefore emerge through infrastructural interlinkage rather than hierarchical authority.

Digital interoperability exemplifies this mechanism. When jurisdictions align technical standards for payments, identity verification, or settlement protocols, they create functional coordination without fully harmonizing legal regimes. Infrastructure becomes a coordination layer bridging institutional fragmentation.


This infrastructural coordination differs from regulatory consolidation. It does not centralize rule-making authority. Instead, it standardizes interaction protocols while preserving sovereignty. The result is coordinated decentralization: local governance embedded within shared regional infrastructure.

From an institutional perspective, interoperability functions as a substitute for supranational governance. It reduces uncertainty and aligns expectations across jurisdictions through technical synchronization rather than formal integration. This substitution mechanism has not been systematically theorized within management scholarship.

## 2.4 Integrative Perspective: Interoperability as Infrastructural Governance

Integrating these three theoretical lenses clarifies the distinctive role of digital interoperability. Transaction Cost Economics explains how standardized infrastructure compresses cross-border coordination costs. Ecosystem theory explains how boundary expansion occurs through reduced participation friction. Regional integration theory explains how coordination may emerge without centralized authority.

Digital interoperability is conceptualized here as a meso-level governance architecture that connects transaction efficiency, ecosystem structuring, and regional institutional alignment. The visual clarifies how interoperability integrates three theoretical traditions into a unified coordination logic. Rather than depicting technical compatibility, the architecture foregrounds infrastructural governance as the organizing principle of cross-border synchronization.



**Figure 1.** Interoperability as Infrastructural Governance Architecture  
*Source: Developed by the authors*

Figure 1 clarifies how digital interoperability connects three theoretical traditions into a unified governance architecture. Transaction Cost Economics informs the logic of transaction cost compression; ecosystem boundary theory explains boundary expansion; and regional coordination scholarship grounds institutional substitution and coordinated decentralization. By positioning interoperability at the center of these relationships, the figure establishes the structural foundation for the mechanism-based analysis that follows.

Taken together, these perspectives position digital interoperability as a form of infrastructural governance. It operates at the meso-level between firm and state, organizing cross-border interaction through standardized protocols rather than hierarchical control. In emerging platform economies, where institutional fragmentation coexists with digital interdependence, such governance mechanisms become structurally significant.


Importantly, this framework avoids conflating interoperability with regulatory harmonization or platform dominance. The argument advanced here is not that interoperability centralizes

power or segments markets. Rather, it reorganizes coordination logic across jurisdictions by embedding standardized interaction within shared infrastructure.

### 3. Mechanism-Based Conceptual Development

Digital interoperability reorganizes regional coordination through identifiable mechanisms rather than diffuse institutional effects. Building on Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1985), ecosystem boundary theory (Adner, 2017; Jacobides et al., 2018), and regional coordination scholarship (Keohane, 1984; Farrell & Newman, 2019), this section specifies four structurally distinct mechanisms through which interoperability reshapes cross-border interaction in emerging platform economies.

Digital interoperability reshapes regional coordination through four distinct but interdependent mechanisms operating at different analytical levels. The figure organizes these mechanisms as a layered architecture so the argument reads as a structured causal system rather than a list of effects. It also makes explicit how the mechanisms reinforce one another to produce regional reconfiguration under fragmented governance.



**Figure 2.** Layered Mechanisms Linking Digital Interoperability to Regional Coordination  
*Source: Developed by the author*

Figure 2 organizes the article’s mechanism-based argument as a layered architecture. Transaction cost compression operates at the transactional level, stabilizing cross-border exchange; institutional substitution shifts coordination from formal harmonization to protocol alignment; ecosystem boundary expansion broadens participation across jurisdictions; and coordinated decentralization captures the resulting pattern of regional alignment without centralized authority.

Each mechanism operates at a different analytical level—transactional, institutional, ecosystemic, and governance-structural—thereby avoiding conflation between infrastructural alignment and political integration.

#### 3.1 Transaction Cost Compression

Transaction Cost Economics posits that governance structures arise to economize on coordination hazards stemming from bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 1985). In cross-border settings, these hazards intensify due to institutional heterogeneity, currency friction, regulatory ambiguity, and enforcement uncertainty. Such frictions increase

monitoring, verification, and settlement costs, thereby discouraging cross-jurisdictional exchange.

Digital interoperability compresses these costs by embedding standardized interfaces within shared infrastructure. Standardized QR codes, instant settlement rails, interoperable digital identity protocols, and harmonized APIs reduce search costs and decrease verification ambiguity. Infrastructural synchronization diminishes information asymmetry by enabling traceability and real-time confirmation across jurisdictions.

Recent digital governance research supports the view that coordination complexity increases with modular interdependence (Cennamo, 2021; Kapoor, 2020). When actors rely on compatible standards, the cost of integrating complementary services declines. Interoperability thus lowers *ex ante* negotiation costs and *ex post* enforcement ambiguity without requiring hierarchical integration.

Unlike vertical integration—which internalizes transactions to mitigate hazard—interoperability preserves decentralized exchange while reducing friction. In this sense, it functions as a quasi-hybrid governance form at the regional level. It embeds coordination rules within protocol standards rather than contractual hierarchy.

**Proposition 1:**

Higher degrees of digital interoperability reduce cross-border transaction costs, increasing transactional density across jurisdictions.

### **3.2 Institutional Substitution Through Infrastructural Alignment**

Regional integration theory traditionally associates coordination with treaty-based harmonization or supranational enforcement (Mattli, 1999; Keohane, 1984). However, in fragmented governance environments, full regulatory convergence is politically constrained. Digital markets nevertheless require predictable cross-border interaction.

Infrastructure can partially substitute for formal institutional convergence. Farrell and Newman (2019) demonstrate how networked infrastructures create structured interdependence capable of shaping cross-border behavior. Similarly, infrastructural power operates through embedded technical standards rather than overt political authority.

Digital interoperability performs this substitutive function by aligning operational protocols across jurisdictions while allowing legal regimes to remain distinct. Shared settlement rails or interoperable identity verification systems reduce the need for harmonized legal frameworks because coordination occurs at the protocol layer. Technical synchronization stabilizes expectations even in the presence of regulatory divergence.

This substitution mechanism does not eliminate institutional heterogeneity. Rather, it mitigates its operational consequences. Actors rely on standardized technical procedures to coordinate, thereby reducing reliance on supranational enforcement mechanisms.

Importantly, this process differs from regulatory consolidation. There is no transfer of sovereign authority to a central regulator. Instead, coordination emerges from infrastructural compatibility.

**Proposition 2:**

Digital interoperability substitutes for supranational institutional harmonization by embedding coordination within shared technical infrastructure.

### **3.3 Ecosystem Boundary Expansion**

Ecosystem theory conceptualizes industries as structured constellations of interdependent actors (Adner, 2017; Jacobides et al., 2018). Ecosystem boundaries define who can

participate and under what conditions. Participation barriers arise when coordination costs exceed expected complementarities.

In cross-border environments, jurisdictional fragmentation restricts ecosystem expansion. Complementors face redesign costs, regulatory uncertainty, and currency risk when entering adjacent markets. These barriers limit regional scaling.

Interoperability reduces such participation friction. By standardizing transactional interfaces and lowering compliance complexity at the infrastructure layer, complementors can access users across jurisdictions without replicating entire technological stacks. Participation shifts from jurisdiction-specific integration to protocol-based integration.

Kapoor (2020) emphasizes that complementarity alignment determines ecosystem expansion. When coordination risk declines, complementor incentives increase. Interoperability thus expands ecosystem boundaries not through orchestrator acquisition or political union, but through friction reduction.

Boundary expansion under interoperability remains decentralized. Actors maintain local regulatory compliance but operate within shared regional infrastructure. The ecosystem expands horizontally rather than hierarchically.

**Proposition 3:**

Digital interoperability lowers jurisdictional participation barriers, thereby expanding ecosystem boundaries across regions.

### 3.4 Coordinated Decentralization

A common assumption in institutional theory is that coordination requires centralization (Scott, 2014). However, infrastructural alignment allows for coordination without hierarchical consolidation. Digital interoperability standardizes interaction rules while preserving decentralized governance authority.

This phenomenon can be conceptualized as coordinated decentralization. Shared protocols create compatibility, but regulatory sovereignty remains intact. Governance authority is distributed, yet interaction is synchronized.

Ecosystem research suggests that governance structures influence value capture and dependency asymmetries (Jacobides et al., 2018). Interoperability reduces exclusive lock-in by enabling multi-homing and cross-platform compatibility. As exclusivity declines, coordination relies more on service differentiation and less on infrastructural control.

Unlike regulatory consolidation—which may centralize oversight—interoperability standardizes interfaces without consolidating decision rights. The result is regional synchronization without political integration.

This mechanism aligns with recent scholarship emphasizing that digital infrastructures can produce coordination effects independently of ownership concentration (Cennamo, 2021). Coordination is embedded in shared standards rather than centralized authority.

**Proposition 4:**

Higher degrees of digital interoperability generate coordinated decentralization, aligning cross-border interaction while preserving jurisdictional autonomy.

### 3.5 Integrated Mechanism Architecture

The four mechanisms operate interdependently. Transaction cost compression increases cross-border interaction frequency. Institutional substitution stabilizes expectations in the absence of supranational authority. Ecosystem boundary expansion broadens participation. Coordinated decentralization preserves sovereignty while enabling synchronization.

Collectively, these mechanisms reconfigure regional coordination logic. Instead of political harmonization driving integration, infrastructural alignment becomes the primary coordination device. Regional digital integration thus emerges from protocol standardization rather than centralized governance.

The table below systematizes the four mechanisms by aligning each with its analytical level, theoretical anchor, core coordination effect, and corresponding proposition. This structured mapping prevents conceptual drift and clarifies how each mechanism contributes distinctly to the overarching governance logic.

**Table 1.** Mechanism Architecture and Theoretical Anchoring

<b>Mechanism</b>	<b>Analytical Level</b>	<b>Theoretical Anchor</b>	<b>Core Coordination Effect</b>	<b>Proposition</b>
Transaction Cost Compression	Transactional	Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1985)	Reduces search, monitoring, and settlement hazards across jurisdictions through protocol standardization	Higher degrees of digital interoperability reduce cross-border transaction costs, increasing transactional density across jurisdictions
Institutional Substitution	Institutional	Regional Institutional Coordination (Keohane, 1984; Farrell & Newman, 2019)	Embeds coordination within shared infrastructure, partially substituting for supranational enforcement	Digital interoperability substitutes for supranational institutional harmonization by embedding coordination within shared technical infrastructure
Ecosystem Boundary Expansion	Ecosystem	Ecosystem Theory (Adner, 2017; Jacobides et al., 2018; Kapoor, 2020)	Lowers jurisdictional participation barriers, expanding complementor and user access across regions	Digital interoperability lowers jurisdictional participation barriers, thereby expanding ecosystem boundaries across regions
Coordinated Decentralization	Governance-structural	Institutional and Ecosystem Governance Perspectives (Scott, 2014; Cennamo, 2021)	Aligns cross-border interaction while preserving jurisdictional autonomy and distributed authority	Higher degrees of digital interoperability generate coordinated decentralization, aligning cross-border interaction while preserving jurisdictional autonomy

*Source: Developed by the author*

Table 1 consolidates the mechanism-based contribution by demonstrating that each mechanism operates at a distinct analytical level and is grounded in a specific theoretical tradition. By aligning propositions with theoretical anchors and coordination effects, Table 1

reinforces the article’s integrative logic and prevents conceptual overlap between mechanisms. The structured mapping also clarifies how infrastructural governance extends existing theories without collapsing them into a single explanatory register.

This mechanism-based explanation extends Transaction Cost Economics to infrastructural governance, expands ecosystem boundary theory to cross-jurisdictional contexts, and enriches regional integration scholarship by identifying infrastructure as an institutional substitute.

## 4. Configurational Regional Outcomes

The mechanisms identified earlier—transaction cost compression, institutional substitution, ecosystem boundary expansion, and coordinated decentralization—do not operate in isolation. Their combined effects generate patterned regional configurations. Rather than assuming that interoperability uniformly produces integration, this section develops a configurational perspective that distinguishes alternative regional coordination trajectories depending on the interaction between infrastructural alignment and institutional fragmentation.

This configurational approach avoids deterministic claims and aligns with ecosystem scholarship emphasizing structural interdependence (Adner, 2017; Jacobides et al., 2018). It also resonates with Transaction Cost Economics, which treats governance outcomes as contingent on hazard profiles rather than universally optimal forms (Williamson, 1985). Regional coordination through digital interoperability should therefore be understood as conditional and path-dependent.

### 4.1 Interoperability and Institutional Fragmentation as Structuring Dimensions

Two structural dimensions shape regional outcomes:

#### 1) Degree of Digital Interoperability

The extent to which transactional infrastructures—such as payment rails, digital identity protocols, or API standards—are technically aligned across jurisdictions.

#### 2) Degree of Institutional Fragmentation

The extent of regulatory divergence, supervisory heterogeneity, and policy inconsistency across jurisdictions.

Regional coordination can also be conceptualized as a patterned interaction between infrastructural intensity and institutional coherence. The alternative matrix below preserves the same analytical dimensions but emphasizes systemic stability and coordination density rather than descriptive labels. This framing highlights equilibrium types instead of developmental stages.

Institutional Fragmentation (High → Low)	<b>Structurally Disconnected Region</b>	<b>Operationally Linked but Institutionally Divergent</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Elevated coordination hazards</li> <li>• Isolated national ecosystems</li> <li>• Low cross-border density</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Shared technical rails</li> <li>• Regulatory asymmetry persists</li> <li>• Conditional system stability</li> </ul>
	<b>Clustered Regional Alignment</b>	<b>Systemically Integrated Digital Region</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduced transaction volatility</li> <li>• Partial normative convergence</li> <li>• Reinforced ecosystem interdependence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High coordination density</li> <li>• Broad boundary permeability</li> <li>• Stable infrastructural synchronization</li> </ul>
	Digital Interoperability (Low → High)	

**Figure 3.** Alternative Configurations of Regional Coordination under Digital Interoperability  
*Source: Developed by the author*

Figure 3 reformulates the configurational logic by emphasizing structural connectivity and systemic stability rather than descriptive regional labels. The upper-left quadrant captures regions where fragmentation and low interoperability sustain disconnection. The upper-right quadrant reflects technical linkage without institutional coherence. The lower-left quadrant depicts clustered alignment where infrastructural compatibility interacts with partial normative convergence. The lower-right quadrant represents systemically integrated digital regions characterized by high coordination density and synchronized interaction. This alternative representation preserves the article's conditional logic while foregrounding infrastructural intensity as the organizing dimension of regional equilibria.

These dimensions generate variation in how coordination unfolds. Interoperability compresses operational friction, yet institutional fragmentation sustains legal and regulatory uncertainty. The interaction between these dimensions determines whether regional coordination stabilizes or remains fragile.

This framing is consistent with research on interdependence, which demonstrates that network connectivity can coexist with political fragmentation (Farrell & Newman, 2019). Infrastructure creates structural linkage, but does not automatically harmonize governance authority.

## **4.2 Fragmented Regional Markets**

When interoperability remains low and institutional fragmentation is high, cross-border coordination is limited. Transaction costs remain elevated due to incompatible standards and divergent regulatory requirements. Ecosystem boundaries remain nationally segmented.

Under such conditions, platform ecosystems replicate domestically rather than integrate regionally. Complementors face redesign costs for each jurisdiction, and scaling strategies rely on country-by-country adaptation. This configuration aligns with TCE predictions: when coordination hazards are high, actors avoid cross-border exchange unless vertically integrated (Williamson, 1985).

Fragmentation does not preclude regional ambition, but it constrains transactional density and limits complementarity alignment (Kapoor, 2020). Regional integration remains politically discussed but operationally weak.

## **4.3 Loosely Coupled Interoperability**

When interoperability increases but institutional fragmentation persists, a loosely coupled configuration emerges. Infrastructure reduces settlement friction, yet regulatory divergence maintains uncertainty at higher levels of governance.

In this configuration, transaction cost compression stimulates cross-border exchange, but strategic adaptation remains necessary. Complementors gain technical access across markets, yet must navigate heterogeneous compliance requirements. Coordination improves operationally, but institutional substitution remains partial.

This intermediate configuration resembles what Adner (2017) characterizes as structural alignment without full system integration. Actors are linked through shared protocols, yet governance remains jurisdictionally anchored. Regional scaling becomes feasible, but not frictionless.

Such loosely coupled interoperability may increase transactional density while preserving competitive differentiation rooted in local regulatory variation. It therefore enhances economic connectivity without dissolving national market identities.

#### **4.4 Coordinated Clusters**

When interoperability is high and institutional fragmentation is moderate—characterized by partial regulatory alignment or mutual recognition—regional coordination stabilizes more strongly. Institutional substitution becomes more effective because infrastructural alignment is complemented by converging supervisory norms.

In this configuration, ecosystem boundaries expand across clusters of jurisdictions. Complementors experience predictable participation rules, and transaction hazards decline further. The region functions as a coordinated bloc, though not a supranational union.

This outcome reflects hybrid governance consistent with TCE logic: coordination hazards are sufficiently reduced to permit decentralized exchange, yet sovereignty is preserved. Ecosystem theory suggests that complementarity alignment strengthens under stable coordination regimes (Jacobides et al., 2018). Regional clusters therefore exhibit increased multi-homing and reduced exclusivity.

Importantly, coordination here emerges from infrastructural and normative alignment rather than centralized authority. Political integration remains limited, yet economic synchronization deepens.

#### **4.5 Integrated Regional Digital Blocs**

The most integrated configuration occurs when interoperability is high and institutional fragmentation is low. Technical synchronization and regulatory convergence reinforce one another. Transaction cost compression and institutional substitution operate synergistically.

Under such conditions, ecosystem boundaries become regionally expansive and structurally cohesive. Complementors operate seamlessly across jurisdictions. Governance decentralization remains intact at the national level, but operational coordination resembles that of a unified market.

This configuration approaches functional regional integration. However, it remains infrastructurally mediated rather than politically centralized. The distinction is analytically important: integration results from layered coordination rather than hierarchical authority.

Research on digital interdependence suggests that infrastructural connectivity can produce integration effects even in the absence of political union (Farrell & Newman, 2019). The regional digital bloc therefore represents the upper bound of interoperability-driven coordination, not necessarily the endpoint of political integration.

#### **4.6 Dynamic Interaction and Path Dependence**

These configurations are not static. Interoperability initiatives often begin as operational experiments before expanding into broader alignment. Transaction cost compression may initially increase cross-border exchange, generating pressure for regulatory convergence over time. Conversely, political divergence may constrain deeper infrastructural integration.

Table 1 consolidates the mechanism-based contribution by demonstrating that each mechanism operates at a distinct analytical level and is grounded in a specific theoretical tradition. By aligning propositions with theoretical anchors and coordination effects, Table 1 reinforces the article's integrative logic and prevents conceptual overlap between mechanisms. The structured mapping also clarifies how infrastructural governance extends existing theories without collapsing them into a single explanatory register.

**Table 2. Mechanism Architecture and Theoretical Anchoring**

<b>Regional Configuration</b>	<b>Degree of Digital Interoperability</b>	<b>Degree of Institutional Fragmentation</b>	<b>Cross-Border Transaction Costs</b>	<b>Ecosystem Boundary Scope</b>	<b>Governance Structure</b>
Fragmented Regional Markets	Low	High	High and volatile	Nationally segmented	Jurisdictionally isolated governance
Loosely Coupled Interoperability	Moderate to High	High	Operationally reduced but legally contingent	Technically expanded but compliance-constrained	Protocol alignment without regulatory coherence
Coordinated Clusters	High	Moderate	Significantly reduced	Regionally clustered and mutually accessible	Distributed governance with partial normative convergence
Integrated Regional Digital Blocs	High	Low	Low and predictable	Broad regional permeability	Coordinated decentralization with strong infrastructural synchronization

*Source: Developed by the author*

Table 2 sharpens the configurational argument by distinguishing how interoperability interacts with institutional fragmentation to produce distinct coordination equilibria. Rather than implying a linear progression, the table clarifies that each configuration represents a structurally coherent outcome shaped by the interplay between infrastructural intensity and institutional context. By specifying transaction cost profiles, ecosystem scope, and governance characteristics, Table 2 reinforces the article’s central claim that digital interoperability generates conditional, not deterministic, regional integration trajectories.

This dynamic interaction underscores the importance of avoiding overclaim. Digital interoperability does not automatically produce regional integration. Its coordination effects depend on institutional context and the durability of shared standards.

From an ecosystem perspective, expanded boundaries increase interdependence, which in turn raises coordination demands (Adner, 2017). If institutional alignment fails to keep pace, loosely coupled systems may experience instability. Conversely, stable interoperability may gradually institutionalize expectations, reinforcing normative convergence.

This recursive interaction between infrastructure and institutions aligns with institutional theory’s emphasis on gradual field stabilization (Scott, 2014). Infrastructure may precede legal convergence, but sustained coordination requires complementary institutional reinforcement.

#### **4.7 Theoretical Synthesis**

The configurational perspective clarifies three analytical insights. First, digital interoperability should not be equated with uniform integration. Its impact varies depending on institutional fragmentation. Transaction cost compression enables exchange, but governance divergence shapes its limits.

Second, infrastructural coordination can precede and potentially induce institutional convergence. This mechanism reframes regional integration theory by highlighting infrastructure as a coordination catalyst rather than a derivative outcome.

Third, ecosystem boundary expansion is contingent rather than automatic. Interoperability lowers participation barriers, yet complementarity alignment depends on predictable institutional environments (Kapoor, 2020).

By integrating TCE, ecosystem theory, and regional coordination scholarship, this section demonstrates that digital interoperability restructures regional coordination through conditional and path-dependent mechanisms. Rather than overclaiming transformative inevitability, the framework specifies how infrastructural alignment interacts with institutional context to generate distinct regional configurations.

This analytical precision strengthens the contribution: digital interoperability is neither a purely technical upgrade nor a guaranteed integration engine. It is a structurally significant coordination mechanism whose regional consequences depend on the interplay between infrastructure and institutional heterogeneity.

## **5. Theoretical and Managerial Implications**

The preceding analysis positions digital interoperability as a mechanism of infrastructural governance that reconfigures regional coordination in emerging platform economies. Rather than reiterating prior arguments, this section distills the implications for three streams of scholarship—Transaction Cost Economics, ecosystem theory, and regional institutional coordination—before outlining calibrated managerial implications. Throughout, claims are bounded to the mechanism-based logic developed earlier.

### **5.1 Implications for Transaction Cost Economics**

Transaction Cost Economics traditionally explains governance choice as a response to exchange hazards under conditions of uncertainty and asset specificity (Williamson, 1985). The canonical focus has been on firm boundaries—make, buy, or hybrid arrangements. More recent extensions incorporate digital complexity and modular interdependence (Verbeke & Hutzschenreuter, 2021), yet the locus of analysis remains organizational.

The present framework extends TCE in two analytically distinct ways.

First, it shifts the level of analysis from firm boundaries to infrastructural governance. Cross-border interoperability demonstrates that transaction cost economizing can occur through protocol standardization rather than ownership integration. Governance is embedded within shared infrastructure rather than hierarchy or contract alone. This reframes hybrid governance beyond joint ventures or alliances, conceptualizing interoperable infrastructure as a quasi-hybrid arrangement at the regional level.

Second, the analysis differentiates between transaction cost compression and institutional harmonization. TCE assumes that governance reduces hazards through structural alignment. However, digital interoperability shows that operational hazard reduction may occur independently of legal convergence. Infrastructural alignment can compress monitoring and verification costs even when regulatory heterogeneity persists.

This distinction refines TCE's treatment of uncertainty. Not all institutional divergence produces equivalent transaction hazards. When standardized infrastructure mitigates operational ambiguity, cross-border exchange can expand without full legal integration. Consequently, governance efficiency may precede institutional convergence rather than follow it.

The contribution is therefore incremental but meaningful: TCE can accommodate infrastructural governance as a cost-economizing mechanism operating at a regional level without presupposing political integration.

## 5.2 Implications for Ecosystem Theory

Ecosystem research emphasizes structured interdependence, complementarity alignment, and governance configuration (Adner, 2017; Jacobides et al., 2018). Prior work has primarily examined ecosystem formation within industries or national contexts. Boundary expansion is typically framed as a strategic decision by focal platforms.

The present framework extends ecosystem theory by introducing cross-jurisdictional boundary expansion as a structurally mediated phenomenon. Digital interoperability reduces participation friction at the infrastructural level, enabling complementors to access multiple jurisdictions without full system redesign. Boundary permeability thus emerges not only from platform openness but from cross-border protocol alignment.

This perspective clarifies an under-theorized dimension of ecosystem topology: regional scale as a function of infrastructural compatibility. Ecosystem expansion is not solely a competitive strategy; it is partly conditioned by shared infrastructure.

Additionally, the concept of coordinated decentralization refines debates about governance centralization. Ecosystem scholarship often associates coordination with orchestrator control (Cennamo, 2021). Interoperability demonstrates an alternative pattern: coordination through standardization rather than concentration. Shared technical protocols synchronize interaction while preserving distributed authority.

This insight tempers deterministic assumptions linking integration to dominance. Interoperability may reduce exclusivity and increase multi-homing, thereby redistributing bargaining power rather than consolidating it. Ecosystem outcomes therefore depend not only on orchestrator strategy but on infrastructural architecture.

## 5.3 Implications for Regional Institutional Coordination

Regional integration scholarship typically centers on treaty-based harmonization or supranational authority (Keohane, 1984; Mattli, 1999). Emerging regions, however, often lack such centralized structures while exhibiting deepening digital interdependence.

By conceptualizing digital interoperability as **institutional substitution**, this article introduces a functional pathway to coordination. Infrastructure can align expectations and stabilize exchange in the absence of political union. This does not eliminate regulatory heterogeneity but mitigates its operational consequences.

The implication is theoretical restraint rather than overextension. Interoperability does not guarantee integration, nor does it replace formal institutions entirely. Instead, it provides a coordination layer that can precede, complement, or partially substitute legal convergence.

This layered understanding contributes to scholarship on interdependence (Farrell & Newman, 2019) by highlighting infrastructure as a mediating mechanism between fragmentation and integration. Regional coordination may therefore evolve through infrastructural embedding before institutional consolidation.

## 5.4 Managerial Implications

The mechanism-based framework also yields calibrated managerial insights for platform strategists and regional policymakers. These implications remain grounded in structural logic rather than prescriptive optimism.

### Strategic Positioning in Interoperable Regions

For platform firms, interoperability reduces entry friction across jurisdictions. However, reduced exclusivity implies intensified competition based on service differentiation rather than infrastructural lock-in. Firms must therefore recalibrate competitive advantage from

access control toward operational excellence, user experience, and complementary innovation.

Multi-homing becomes structurally easier under high interoperability. Complementors can participate across ecosystems with lower switching costs. Platforms must compete on ecosystem value rather than technical enclosure.

### **Participation in Infrastructure Coalitions**

Interoperability often emerges through collaborative infrastructure initiatives. Strategic participation in standard-setting forums and regional coordination bodies becomes critical. Engagement at the infrastructural layer can influence protocol evolution and compatibility scope.

However, the framework cautions against assuming that infrastructure participation automatically yields dominance. Coordinated decentralization preserves distributed governance. Strategic advantage arises from alignment capability rather than control concentration.

### **Policy Design and Sequencing**

For policymakers in emerging platform economies, the analysis suggests that infrastructural alignment can stimulate regional exchange even before full regulatory harmonization is politically feasible. Interoperability initiatives may function as pragmatic coordination devices.

Yet policy sequencing matters. Without complementary institutional reinforcement, loosely coupled interoperability may generate instability. Transaction cost compression must be accompanied by supervisory compatibility to sustain trust.

Thus, infrastructural integration should be viewed as part of a layered coordination strategy rather than a standalone solution.

## **5.5 Boundary Conditions and Analytical Limits**

To avoid conceptual inflation, it is important to specify boundary conditions. First, the framework applies primarily to digitally mediated industries where standardized interfaces meaningfully reduce transaction hazards. In sectors with high physical asset specificity or deep regulatory divergence, interoperability may have limited coordination effects.

Second, political conflict can constrain infrastructural alignment. Interoperability presupposes at least minimal cooperative intent among jurisdictions. Severe geopolitical fragmentation may override infrastructural benefits.

Third, transaction cost compression does not eliminate all hazards. Legal enforcement disputes, systemic risk, and macroeconomic volatility may persist despite standardized protocols.

Recognizing these limits ensures proportionality. Digital interoperability is a structurally significant coordination mechanism, but not a universal integration engine.

## **5.6 Integrative Reflection**

Across theoretical and managerial domains, a common insight emerges: digital interoperability reorganizes coordination by embedding governance within shared infrastructure. It reduces operational friction, expands ecosystem boundaries, and aligns cross-border interaction without centralizing authority.

This reframing shifts scholarly attention from political harmonization to infrastructural synchronization. Regional integration in emerging platform economies may therefore unfold through layered coordination—technical first, institutional later—rather than through top-down consolidation.

Such a perspective enriches understanding of how digital economies evolve under fragmented governance conditions while maintaining analytical restraint regarding their transformative scope.

## 6. Conclusion

Digital markets are frequently described as borderless, yet cross-border coordination remains structurally constrained by institutional fragmentation. Emerging platform economies illustrate this tension vividly: digital infrastructures expand rapidly, while political integration and regulatory convergence evolve unevenly. Against this backdrop, digital interoperability represents a structurally significant development—not because it eliminates institutional diversity, but because it reorganizes how coordination occurs across it.

This article conceptualizes digital interoperability as a mechanism of infrastructural governance. By integrating Transaction Cost Economics, ecosystem boundary theory, and regional institutional coordination scholarship, the analysis demonstrates that interoperability reshapes regional coordination through four interrelated mechanisms: transaction cost compression, institutional substitution, ecosystem boundary expansion, and coordinated decentralization. These mechanisms collectively explain how regional synchronization can emerge without supranational authority.

The central contribution lies in reframing interoperability from a technical compatibility feature to a structural coordination device. Transaction cost compression reduces operational friction across jurisdictions, increasing transactional density without requiring hierarchical integration. Institutional substitution embeds coordination within shared protocols, partially mitigating the absence of centralized enforcement. Ecosystem boundary expansion lowers jurisdictional participation barriers, enabling regional scaling through infrastructural alignment. Coordinated decentralization preserves sovereignty while standardizing interaction, producing synchronization without consolidation.

Importantly, the configurational perspective advanced in this article tempers deterministic interpretations. Interoperability does not automatically produce integration. Its regional effects depend on the degree of institutional fragmentation and the durability of shared standards. Loosely coupled systems may expand exchange while preserving regulatory divergence; coordinated clusters may stabilize cross-border ecosystems without political union; fully integrated digital blocs represent only one possible outcome. By specifying these configurations, the framework avoids overclaim and preserves analytical proportionality.

Theoretically, the study extends Transaction Cost Economics beyond firm-boundary decisions to infrastructural governance across jurisdictions. It enriches ecosystem theory by introducing cross-jurisdictional boundary expansion as a structurally mediated phenomenon. It contributes to regional coordination scholarship by identifying infrastructure as a functional substitute for supranational harmonization. Together, these extensions suggest that regional integration in digital economies may proceed through layered infrastructural embedding rather than formal political consolidation.

Managerially and institutionally, the analysis underscores that competitive advantage in interoperable regions shifts from infrastructural enclosure to service differentiation and alignment capability. Policymakers, in turn, may leverage interoperability as a pragmatic coordination layer while recognizing that durable integration requires complementary institutional reinforcement.

Digital interoperability therefore occupies a distinctive position within emerging platform economies: it neither dissolves sovereignty nor centralizes authority, yet it materially reorganizes cross-border interaction. Regional coordination increasingly unfolds through shared technical architectures that stabilize exchange without eliminating diversity.

Understanding this infrastructural pathway provides a more precise account of how digital economies integrate under fragmented governance conditions.

In sum, digital interoperability should be understood as a structurally bounded yet strategically consequential coordination mechanism—one that reconfigures regional economic organization by embedding governance within shared infrastructure rather than within centralized political authority.

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